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BRANCHING AND MERGING UNDER NEW YORK'S
OMNIBUS BANKING LAW
State-chartered banks and trust companies in New York State
have been permitted to open branches within their head office city
since before the turn of the century.1 The large number of bank
failures in the 1930's led many to propose some expansion of the
branching and merger powers in order to strengthen a system seri-
ously weakened by the Depression.2 The New York State Legislature
reacted in 1934 by enacting legislation which divided New York State
into nine districts within which state banks and trust companies could
branch and merge? State banks and trust companies, however, could
not branch into a city or village in which there was already located
the "home office" of another bank, trust company or national banking
association.4
The law pertaining to branching and merging remained un-
changed despite criticism and persistent lobbying for twenty-six years
by the larger commercial banking institutions of the state, par-
ticularly those located in New York City.' Agitation for reform of
what was considered by disinterested students to be an archaic banking
code culminated in serious legislative consideration in 1959 of a bill
essentially the same as that finally enacted in 1960. This bill, however,
although vigorously pressed by the leaders of the Republican Party
which controlled both houses of the New York Legislature, was de-
feated by a coalition consisting of the entire Democratic minority and
a group of Republicans?
The same coalition was expected to prevent passage of the 1960
legislation 7 but a sudden shift in both houses by Democratic legis-
lators from Brooklyn and the Bronx' resulted in swift enactment of
the so-called Omnibus Banking Bill of 1960.' The new Omnibus
Banking Law made significant changes in the law pertaining to branch-
ing and merging of banks in the New York City area. The 1960 bill
1 NEW YORK STATE BANKING DEPARTmIENT, BRANCH BANKING, BANK MERGERS
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 8 (1964).
2Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4Ibld.
5 Ibid.
I N.Y. Times, March 14, 1960, p. 28, col. 2.
7 N.Y. Times, March 16, 1960, p. 51, col. 1.
8 The Democratic shift was precipitated by the addition to the bill of a hastily
conceived amendment which gave to New York City savings institutions some of the
branching privileges which the commercial banks were to enjoy. N.Y. Times, March
22, 1960, p. 26, col. 4.
9 Id. at 1, col. 2.
(218)
OMNIBUS BANKING LAW
and subsequent minor amendments in 1963 and 1964 amended section
105 of the New York Banking Law to read:
1. No bank or trust company or officer, director, agent or
employee thereof, shall transact any part of its usual business
of banking at any place other than its principal office, except
as follows:
(a) A bank or trust company may open and occupy
in the city or incorporated village in which is located its
principal office one or more branch offices, whether or not
such city or incorporated village is located entirely within
one banking district, and
(b) a bank or trust company may open and occupy a
branch office or branch offices in any city or village located
in the banking district in which is located its principal office,
provided, however, that a bank or trust company with its
principal office in a city with a population of more than one
million may open and occupy one or more branch offices in
any county adjoining such city if such county has a population
of more than seven hundred thousand; and further, provided,
however, that any bank or trust company whose principal
office is located in a county with a population of more than
seven hundred thousand and which county adjoins a city
with a population of more than one million may open and
occupy one or more branch offices in such adjoining city
whether or not such city is located entirely within one banking
district, provided in no event shall a branch be opened and
occupied pursuant to this paragraph (b) in a city or village
with a population of one million or less in which is already
located the principal office of another bank, trust company
or national banking association, . . except, in the case
of a conversion pursuant to the provisions of this article,
branch offices occupied immediately prior thereto or except
for the purpose of acquiring by merger, sale or otherwise
the business and property of a bank, trust company or national
banking association, whether in liquidation or doing business
in the usual course.'0
The 1960 legislation also amended section 600 of the New York
Banking Law to read:
The following mergers are hereby authorized:
(1) One or more corporations organized under the laws of
this state and subject to the provisions of article three,
article seven, article eight, article eleven or article twelve of
10 N.Y. BANKNG LAW § 105.
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this chapter with another corporation subject to the pro-
visions of the same article and located in the same banking
district or in the same city, whether or not such city is
located entirely within one banking district; provided, how-
ever, that one or more corporations organized under the laws
of this state and subject to the provisions of article three of
this chapter and whose principal office is located in a city
with a population of more than one million or in a county
with a population of more than seven hundred thousand,
if such county adjoins such city, may merge with another
corporation subject to the provisions of the same article and
similarly located, and further provided that any branch
acquired as a result of such merger but which is not located
in such city or adjoining county may be continued to be
operated for a period of five years after the date of such
merger even though the occupancy of such branch would
otherwise be prohibited by any other provision of this
chapter."
The enactment of this legislation bestowed on commercial banks
located in New York City, the only city in New York State with a
population of more than one million, the right to branch into the
suburban counties of Westchester and Nassau, the only counties with a
population of seven hundred thousand adjoining a city with a popula-
tion of one million, subject to the principal office restriction, and to
merge with commercial banking institutions in these counties. Passage
also enabled the commercial banks of Nassau and Westchester Counties
to branch without restriction into the five boroughs of New York City
and to merge with commercial banks whose principal office was located
in that city.
I. CHALLENGES TO THE VALIDITY OF THE BILL
The passions which passage of this bill aroused can be attested
to by statements of various Westchester political figures. State
Senator William F. Condon of Yonkers stated on the floor of the
Senate: "For many years we've been aware that the powerful, always
greedy big banks of New York City have had their hungry eyes on
Westchester." 'x Arnold D. Roseman, of Westchester's Board of
Supervisors, described the legislature's action as the "rape of
Westchester." "3
The passions of most suburban public officials and bankers soon
subsided, but not those of Arthur T. Roth, Chairman of Nassau
County's largest bank, The Franklin National Bank of Long Island,
11 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 600.
12 N.Y. Times, March 22, 1960, p. 26, col. 4.
'3 N.Y. Times, March 23, 1960, p. 1, col. 2.
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and the most intransigent foe of the expansion of New York City
banks into Nassau County. No doubt fearful that competition from
the giant banks of New York City would retard further growth of
his institution, he soon termed the law "bad legislation," "illegal
legislation" and "unconstitutional legislation." "4 Mr. Roth brought
suit against the Superintendent of Banks of the State of New York.
Besides asserting that Governor Rockefeller was unqualified to sign
the banking law because of his direct or indirect interest in various
banking institutions, he contested the legality of the Omnibus Banking
Law on the grounds that it unduly discriminated against Franklin
National and that the bill had been enacted without adherence to
certain mandatory procedural requirements.' 5 The basis for the undue
discrimination count was the allegation that the Federal Reserve Board
would not permit Franklin National to continue as a "country bank"
if it entered New York City with branches. "Country banks" at the
time of this litigation were those outside the so-called central reserve
and reserve cities. The loss of this status would result in Franklin
National's being required to keep 16 or 18.5% of its deposits as cash
reserves instead of 11 % as it was required to do as a "country bank." 16
State Senators Daniel G. Albert of Nassau County and William
F. Condon of Westchester County testified that they had not had a
complete copy of the Omnibus Banking Law before them in its final
form when it was passed by the Senate on March 21, 1960.17 On the
basis of this and other testimony, Justice Saypol ruled that Franklin
National was entitled to a judgment declaring that the Omnibus
Banking Law of 1960 was void and had not become law for two
reasons: (1) when it was called up for final passage on the night of
March 21 or the early morning of March 22, 1960, the bill was not on
the desks of the members of the legislature in final form, in violation
of article III, section 14, of the New York Constitution, and (2) the
existence of the original law in the archives and in the custody of
the Secretary of the State of New York was in doubt and unexplained,
contrary to the provisions of sections 40, 41, 42 and 44 of the Legis-
lative Law of New York State.'8
The decree invalidating the Omnibus Banking Law of 1960 was
handed down on March 15, 1961."9 Republican legislators in both
14 N.Y. Times, May 6, 1960, p. 43, col. 6.
15 Franklin Nat1 Bank v. Clark, 26 Misc. 2d 724, 212 N.Y.S.2d 942 (Sup. Ct.
1961).
16 N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1960, p. 55, col. 5.
17Franldin Nat Bank v. Clark, 26 Misc. 2d 724, 725, 212 N.Y.S.2d 942, 945
(Sup. Ct. 1961).
18 Franklin National's numerous allegations of state and federal substantive con-
stitutional infirmities, federal preemption of the field, impairment of contract, lack of
equal protection of the laws and absence of due process were not decided because the
record presented a procedural ground upon which the case could be and was decided.
Id. at 727, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 947.
19 N.Y. Times, March 16, 1961, p. 1, col. 2.
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houses agreed the following day to re-enact the 1960 branch banking
law on March 17.2o Legislators cited two reasons to explain the haste
with which they were acting. One was the fear of a possible run on
the financial institutions already located in Nassau and Westchester
Counties which were enjoined by the decree from conducting business
at their new locations.2 The second was indignation over what the
legislative leaders and members regarded as unwarranted judicial
interference with the legislative process.2 The legislature, without
consideration or discussion of the merits, re-enacted the 1960 bill with
a proviso which validated action taken under the act. Governor
Rockefeller signed the bill on March 17, 1961.'
II. INSTITUTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES
The passage and re-enactment of the Omnibus Banking Law of
1960 were a response to a particular social need. The movement of
many families and the commercial enterprises which followed them to
the suburban areas adjacent to New York City created a demand for
banking facilities and resources which most objective observers be-
lieved could not be satisfied by the financial institutions located in
Nassau and Westchester Counties. The Omnibus Law was the legis-
lative response to this problem. The objective of this Comment is not
to determine whether this economic need has been satisfied by this
legislation, but rather to describe and analyze the movement of
New York City banks into Nassau and Westchester Counties and the
manner, de novo branching or merger, in which entry was accom-
plished; to ascertain the impact which the entry of the city banks has
had on the banking public; and to posit the legal changes and reforms
necessary to facilitate further the integration of the New York metro-
politan community into a single banking area without altering the
basic approach taken by the Omnibus Banking Law.
A. Expansion Into Suburbia Via Merger
State Superintendent of Banks, G. Russel Clark, announced that
state-chartered commercial banks would, after the Omnibus Law be-
came effective, be allowed to use unissued stock up to 5% of total
authorized capital stock for acquisition purposes. He also announced
that state-chartered banks would be able to purchase directly the stock
of other banks in mergers. A circuitous route such as that used by
Chase Manhattan Bank to acquire the West Indies Bank and Trust
Company would no longer have to be followed.' In that transaction
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
2 3N.Y. Times, March 18, 1961, p. 26, col. 4.
24 N.Y. Times, June 21, 1960, p. 43, col. 1.
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a securities dealer purchased Chase Manhattan shares on the open
market for delivery to West Indies' shareholders in exchange for the
bank assets. This innovation was certainly to the benefit of merger-
minded banks, but Superintendent Clark had already made clear that
he was opposed to the acquisition of big Nassau and Westchester
County banks by even bigger New York banks. He had said that
in view of the Omnibus Law's preamble, which specifically required
healthy and nondestructive competition, he would not like to see
present domination of Nassau and Westchester by large suburban
banks merely replaced by domination by a few big New York City
banks.'
Expansion via merger has not been a conspicuously successful way
for New York City banks to gain entry into the suburbs. On April
13, 1961, the State Banking Board turned down the proposal of
Bankers Trust Company of New York City to acquire the County
Trust Company of White Plains, the largest commercial bank in
Westchester County. The Board rejected the contention that New
York City and Westchester should be considered a single banking
market.2" Superintendent Clark pointed out that if the Bankers
Trust-County Trust merger had been approved, and if the then pending
application of First National City Bank to acquire the National Bank of
Westchester were approved by the Comptroller of the Currency, 75%
of the commercial banking assets of the county would be controlled
by two New York City banks.2 7 The Comptroller, however, denied
First National City's application and said: "Large scale entry by this
merger would cause an unreasonable distortion and dislocation in
the present and future banking structure of Westchester County." 28
The Comptroller, James J. Saxon, said that he did not object on
antitrust grounds, but on the ground that the expansion of big city
banks into suburbia should be gradual rather than sudden.29  The
Department of Justice and the Federal Reserve Board (which has no
jurisdiction in this area over nationally-chartered banks) had ob-
jected to the merger on antitrust grounds.3" Mr. Saxon had con-
tended that the merger would not have resulted in a substantial lessen-
ing of competition and that there existed no possibility of First
National City's acquiring a monopoly.3'
The initial attempts of two other large New York City banks to
merge with suburban banks of substantial size were also unsuccessful.
Chase Manhattan's application to merge with the Hempstead Bank,
2 N.Y. Times, April 27, 1960, p. 49, col. 3.
2 N.Y. Times, April 14, 1961, p. 39, col. 1.
27 N.Y. Times, April 16, 1961, § 3, p. 1, col. 1.
2 N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1961, p. 47, col. 1.
o Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1961, p. 47, col. 1.
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which had fifteen offices on Long Island and $76,000,000 in assets,
although approved by the New York State Banking Department,
was denied.3 Chase Manhattan at this time had 105 offices and
$7,578,000,000 in assets. Chemical Bank New York Trust Company,
which also had received state approval for its merger plans, was not
permitted to acquire the Long Island Trust Company, Garden City,
Long Island. 3 Governor Mills of the Federal Reserve Board dis-
sented in both decisions. He contended that Nassau County was an
integral part of the New York City metropolitan area and that limiting
banking services in Nassau to those in existence was a guarantee to
the Franklin National Bank and the Meadow Brook National Bank
of lasting protection in their already dominant financial positions.3 4
The clear and obvious thrust of these decisions was that the
federal regulatory agencies, the Federal Reserve Board and the
Comptroller of the Currency, were not going to permit the absorption
of large suburban branch chains by the even larger New York City
banks. If the suburban area were to become an arena for com-
petition, the large New York City banks were going to have to resort
to de novo branching or the acquisition of small suburban banks. The
first indication that the federal agencies would permit the largest of
the New York City banks to expand via merger with small suburban
banks was the Federal Reserve Board's decision of May 27, 1963,"'
to permit Chemical Bank New York Trust Company to acquire the
Bank of Rockville Centre Trust Company, located in Nassau County.
The suburban institution had but three offices and less than $40,000,000
in assets."' The Board stated that the entry of Chemical into the
local banking market would provide the community with a broader
range of banking services and also would expose the two other local
banks to keener competition7 The New York banking community
immediately construed the decision as an indication that the Board
would permit further acquisitions provided the acquired bank was
small and lacking in growth potential.3 3 This construction of the
Board's decision was soon proven correct, for on July 26, 1963, the
Federal Reserve Board approved the Bankers Trust Company's appli-
cation to acquire the First National Bank of Farmingdale.3 9 The
Board emphasized that, as Farmingdale was a somewhat passive
competitor, the merger would quicken existing competition. It noted
32 48 FED. RESERV E BULL. 544-45 (1962).
33 Id. at 548.
34 N.Y. Times, May 1, 1962, p. 49, col. 5.
35 49 FED. RxsEavE BuLL. 785 (1963).
as Id. at 785, 787.
-7 Id. at 785-87.
38 N.Y. Times, May 29, 1963, p. 41, col. 2.
Be 49 FE. Rasmva BuLL. 1074 (1963).
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also that Farmingdale had a serious management succession problem 40
and that after the merger Farmingdale would no longer have "home
office protection." 41
The Federal Reserve Board has also approved the merger of First
National Bank of Mount Vernon with the Chemical Bank New York
Trust Company.4' The Westchester institution had only four offices
and relatively few assets.43 A major consideration in the Board's de-
cision was that Chemical's acquisition would deprive Mount Vernon
of "home office protection." "' The substantial effect of this merger
on bank competition in Mount Vernon is illustrated by the approval
by Comptroller Saxon, within days of the Board's decision, of branch
applications by First National City Bank of New York and the
National Bank of Westchester." Chase Manhattan, a state-chartered
bank at this time, was also soon given the right to set up a branch
in Mount Vernon.46 The community of 76,000, which prior to the
Board's decision had only one commercial banking institution, now
had four-certainly a significant improvement.47
The position of the present Superintendent of Banks, Frank Wille,
concerning mergers corresponds to that presently held by the Federal
Reserve Board, i.e., that mergers will be permitted as a means of entry
into the suburban banking areas only if there is no significant increase
in commercial bank concentration in the combined New York-
Westchester-Nassau area.48 His position was made clear in his de-
cision of April 22, 1965, rejecting Chemical Bank New York Trust
Company's attempt to acquire the First National Bank of Yonkers.49
His reasoning in denying Chemical's bid is very significant. He
pointed out that although the Yonkers bank had not been aggressive,
did not offer trust, custodial or investment advisory service and gave
Yonkers "home office protection," its absorption by Chemical would
increase the concentration of commercial bank deposits in the four
leading area banks by 0.2% and the percentage of offices belonging to
these banks by 1.3% Even more important in Mr. Wille's eyes,
the proposed merger would eliminate a bank that by itself or by
combining with another or other medium-sized banks could over a
period of time become an effective competitor."1 The obvious implica-
tion of his position is that the First National Bank of Yonkers could
40Id. at 1075.
1 'Id. at 1076.
42 50 FE. RESERvE Bum. 326 (1964).
431d. at 327.
44Id. at 328.
45N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1964, p. 51, col. 1.
46 Ibid.
47Ibid.
48N.Y. Times, April 23, 1965, p. 47, col. 6.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
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merge with a bank other than the giant four: Chemical, Chase
Manhattan, First National City and Manufacturers Hanover. Mr.
Wille, in fact, noted that the establishment of additional branches in
Yonkers is certainly desirable,"' a proposition about which there can
be no dispute.
The regulatory authorities-the State Superintendent of Banks,
the Federal Reserve Board and Comptroller Saxon-have agreed that
competition and the viability of the banking structure of Westchester
and Nassau Counties preclude absorption of large suburban institu-
tions by the giant four of New York City. The merger avenue to
suburbia is, therefore, presently open on an appreciable scale only to
the smaller New York City banks. This is as it should be, for the
degree of competition should be determined by the number of banks
able to offer comparable services to a given banking market. The
number of rivals, not the number of offices, should be the criterion
of competition.
B. Expansion Into Suburbia Via De Novo Branching
After enactment of the Omnibus Banking Law, the consensus
among financial seers was that the major expansion of New York
City banks into Nassau and Westchester Counties would be effectuated
through acquisition of suburban institutions." The major New York
City banks in their initial attempts to expand into the suburbs did
employ the merger-acquisition device, but, as has been shown, this
approach was unsuccessful. The preference which the New York City
banks initially showed for expansion via merger is readily under-
standable, for the "home office protection" provision of the Omnibus
Banking Law locked them out of the most promising locations in
both Nassau and Westchester Counties.54
The first branch office of a New York City commercial bank
was opened on October 28, 1960, by the First National City Bank in
Plainview, Long Island."' First National City was to become, and
still is, the most aggressive "brancher" of New York City banks,
partly because it was the first bank to have its merger application
denied.56 First National City also enjoyed a unique advantage over
its state-chartered competitors which enabled it to branch into com-
munities which lost "home office protection" because of mergers. The
Comptroller " would permit a branch application to be filed while a
52 N.Y. Times, April 23, 1965, p. 47, col. 6.
53 N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1961, § 3, p. 1, col. 1.
54 N.Y. Times, June 17, 1960, p. 43, col. 4.
55 N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1960, p. 51, col. 3.
56 N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1961, p. 47, col. 1.
57 Comptroller Saxon is a strong proponent of expansion through branching and
has been so liberal in approving branch applications that before the New York Finan-
cial Writers Association he was actually jeered by officials of state-chartered banks
when he said that in no banking market in the United States is there too much com-
petition. See N.Y. Times, June 7, 1963, p. 44, col. 4.
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merger application was pending before the Federal Reserve Board.
First National City was thus able to have its applications acted upon
immediately after the Board's approval, if approval of the merger was
forthcoming. Using this procedure, First National City was the first
bank to branch into Rockville Centre after Chemical's acquisition of
the assets of the Bank of Rockville Centre Trust Company."" First
National City was also the first bank to branch into Farmingdale,
Long Island, after Bankers Trust acquired the First National Bank
of Farmingdale. Comptroller Saxon's approval of the application to
branch in this case came before, and was conditioned on, the Board's
approval of the merger.59 This advantage enjoyed by nationally-
chartered banks was not eliminated until February 18, 1964, when
the State Superintendent of Banks announced that thereafter applica-
tions for branching rights would be accepted in advance of merger
approval.60
The expansionist policies of First National City brought charges
by Bruce Wood Hall, Chairman of the $100,000,000 Hempstead Bank,
Hempstead, Long Island, that the bank was engaged in the "shotgun
scattering of billboard branches" with the intention of "milking and
destroying established local banks." "' Complaints similar to Mr.
Hall's from other suburban bankers about what they contended had
been an excessive invasion of Nassau and Westchester Counties by
the multibillion dollar New York City banks led to an evaluation by
the Comptroller of the Currency of the claim that the rush to the
suburbs was leading to "destructive competition." ' The study, con-
ducted by economists in the Comptroller's office, must have startled
the suburban banking community. The report concluded that the
increase in banks in Nassau County from 1958 through 1963-a period
including the three years after passage of the Omnibus Bill-had bene-
fited the user of banking services without causing a deterioration in
the aggregate rate of return on capital of the commercial banks based
on Long Island. In fact, the rate of return of these banks was above
that of all United States banks in the aggregate throughout the 1960-
1963 period and was higher in 1963 than in any of the preceding
five years.
First National City Bank was not the sole giant New York City
bank to establish branches in Nassau and Westchester Counties.
Chemical Bank New York Trust Company, although the most suc-
cessful acquirer via merger, is second to First National in the
number of de novo branches established. Chase Manhattan has been
58 N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1963, p. 36, col. 6.
59 Ibid.
60 N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1964, p. 51, col. 1.
61 N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1963, p. 51, col. 5.
62 N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1963, § 3, p. 1, col. 2.
63 N.Y. Times, June 15, 1964, p. 45, col. 2.
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active in this regard but not as successfully as either First National
City or Chemical. The suggestion has been made that Chase's
recent conversion to a national bank was induced by a comment
by Comptroller Saxon that his office would look more favorably upon
its branch applications than the State Banking Department." If this
was a factor in the decision, it certainly was not an important one.
The primary reason, as was stated by Chase Manhattan's president,
David Rockefeller, when he announced the bank's decision, was that
the increasingly troublesome and difficult limitations and restrictions
placed upon the bank's operation outside New York State by various
other states would be avoided." The decision undoubtedly was also
influenced by the state legislature's shelving of bills which would have
given state-chartered banks the right to lease computer time and to
issue short term unsecured promissory notes-privileges enjoyed by
Chase Manhattan's foremost rival, First National City Bank.
C. Suburban Entry Into New York City Via Merger
The Meadow Brook National Bank, the second largest bank
in Nassau County when the Omnibus Banking Law was enacted, has
been the only Nassau or Westchester bank to enter New York City
via the merger route. Meadow Brook on September 6, 1960, acquired
both the Colonial Trust Company of New York-five offices and
$85,000,000 in assets-and the Queens National Bank with
$30,000,000 in assets.6 Sidney Friedman, the bank's chief counsel,
admitted that passage of the Omnibus Law had prompted the change.
"The passage of the Omnibus Law," he said, "has made us fight, and
we are doing it in the best way we know how. Perhaps if we can
become a billion-dollar bank, we shall be able to compete with the
New York banks in terms they will understand." 6
Meadow Brook's entry into New York City could, however, have
been effectuated under laws existing prior to 1960. Brooklyn and
Queens are part of the second banking district which also embraces
Nassau and Suffolk Counties. Therefore, Meadow Brook could have
merged into Colonial Trust or Queens National before 1960 and by
thus changing its head office it could have acquired the right to branch
into the other three boroughs of New York (Manhattan, Bronx and
Richmond) ; for the legislation enacted in 1934 permitted a commercial
bank to branch anywhere within the city of its principal office-pro-
vided that the city's population was greater than 30,000-even if the
city was not entirely within one banking district."
64 N.Y. Times, July 15, 1965, p. 1, col. 1.
65 Ibid.
66 N.Y. Times, Sept 7, 1960, p. 59, col. 1.
17 Id. at 63, col. 2.
68 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 105.
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The procedure just described theoretically enables every New York
City commercial bank to enter Suffolk County. A bank with its head
office in Manhattan could relocate its head office in Brooklyn or
Queens. A national bank would have to have the approval of the
Comptroller of the Currency to move its head office. 9 A state-
chartered bank, however, would have to merge into a Brooklyn or
Queens bank in order to change the borough of its head office, for
there exists a statutory prohibition against a bank's relocation of its
head office outside its home county or borough.7" There is no reported
instance between 1960 and 1966 of a national or state-chartered bank
using this route to Suffolk, although bills which would have granted
New York City banks the right to branch into Suffolk County have
been introduced in both the 1964 " and 1965 72 legislative sessions.
D. Suburban Entry Into New York City Via De Novo Branching
The Omnibus Banking Law of 1960 enables suburban banks to
branch de novo into New York City without restriction, but only
Franklin National Bank of Long Island has availed itself of this
privilege, and its first New York City office was not scheduled to be
opened until May 18, 1964."3 The delayed entry of Franklin National
into New York City is easily explained. Entry into New York City
before mid-1961 would have cost the suburban giant its "country
bank" status, and the increased reserve requirement, in the opinion
of its chairman, Arthur T. Roth, would have resulted in a $750,000 per
year drop in earnings.7"
After mid-1961 it became apparent to Franklin's management
that the bank would soon lose its "country bank" status whether or
not it moved into New York City-Mr. Roth reported to the New
York Times that he had been told by the Federal Reserve Board that
all banks holding .4% of the average checking account deposits in
the United States would be classified as "reserve city" banks.75 The
bank's failure to move immediately into New York City after learning
of the impending change in its status is explained by the fact that
Franklin National simply did not intend to compete with the larger
and solidly entrenched commercial banks of New York City. For
a long time the new entrant could expect to get only the marginal
business, and Mr. Roth did not wish to interrupt Franklin National's
6973 Stat 457 (1959), 12 U.S.C. §30 (1964).
70 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 113.
71 N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1964, p. 37, col. 7.
72 N.Y. Times, May 11, 1965, p. 33, col. 2.
73 N.Y. Times, May 12, 1964, p. 49, col. 3.
74 N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1961, p. 45, col. 7.
75 N.Y. Times, April 29, 1961, p. 26, col. 2.
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steady increase in earnings per share and increase in assets.7 It was
not until the aggressive expansion of the New York City banks, par-
ticularly First National City, foreclosed further expansion in Nassau
County that Mr. Roth announced his plans to open twenty-five offices
in New York City.77 He acknowledged that earnings per share would
drop and that the bank's current dividend could not be increased be-
cause of the contemplated 50% increase in offices.78
III. IMPACT ON THE PUBLIC
As mentioned above, 9 a study conducted by the Comptroller of
the Currency concluded that the entry of New York City banks into
Nassau County has benefited the banking public of that area and that
this has been accomplished without deterioration in the aggregate rate
of return on the capital of the commercial banks based in the suburbs.8 °
The study was limited to Nassau County, but there were no factors
considered which would indicate that different conclusions would have
been reached if the study had also covered Westchester County.
A comprehensive study to determine the impact of the branching-
merging phenomenon upon the public which uses banking services was
undertaken by the New York State Banking Department."' The
necessary data was obtained by questionnaires sent to all commercial
banks in New York State which had made acquisitions or established
branches from January 1, 1951, through December 31, 1961. Because
of the litigation surrounding the enactment of the Omnibus Law,
activity under it did not begin in earnest until after July, 1961.
Consequently, the data acquired and analyzed in the report did not
pertain to most of the mergers and branching pursuant to the
Omnibus Law. The study, however, is significant in that it describes
the effects on the banking public of branching and merging in New
York State and thus provides a basis for discussion of the impact
of the Omnibus Law.
The first and possibly the most controversial issue regarding
banking relates to the meeting of local credit needs. Critics of branch
banking and bank mergers often claim that branch banks are not as
sympathetic to local credit needs as are unit banks, that out-of-town
branches are generally regarded as deposit-collecting agencies exporting
loanable funds to the head office for its use, and that, as a result, the
76 From October 21, 1961, to January 1, 1964, Franklin National's assets rose
from $850,000,000 to $1,300,000,000. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1964, p. 27, col. 6;
N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1961, p. 25, col. 1.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 See text accompanying notes 62-63 supra.
80 N.Y. Times, June 15, 1964, p. 45, col. 2.
s1 NEW YORK STATE BANKING DEPARTMENT, BRANCH BANKING, BANK MERGERS
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1964).
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credit needs of the locality in which the out-of-town branch is located
are not adequately met. 2 The proponents of branch banking insist
that branches stand ready to meet all sound loan requests, that it would
be poor policy and unprofitable in the long run for a branch to be
insensitive to the credit needs of the local community, that branch
banking enhances the mobility of funds by shifting them to areas where
loan demand is greatest and that the local branch can better serve
the community's needs because of the parent bank's larger loan limit.'
The study revealed that an examination of available information on
loan-deposit ratios indicated that although some of the data does lend
support to the critics of branch banking, most of the findings tend to
cast doubt on the validity of the charge that out-of-town branches of
branch banks were less active than locally based banks in meeting
local credit needs8
A variation of the claim that branch banks do not adequately
serve the credit needs of their out-of-town branch communities is that
a branch bank's lending policies tend to be more impersonal than those
of a unit bank since the branch manager is bound by the head office
"rule book" and that granting of loans is, therefore, based less upon
character than upon collateral 5 Branch banks' proponents maintain
that all loans which meet the normal standards of creditworthiness
will be made, regardless of whether the loan is secured, and that
considerations of personal friendship or local pride should not be the
determining factor in granting bank loans! 6 The study concluded
that on this point the available evidence, although it did not all point
to the same conclusion, was consistent with the proposition that
out-of-town branches of branch banks, particularly large branch banks,
were less active than unit banks in making unsecured loans smaller
than $25,000.87
Proponents of unit banks often claim that out-of-town branch
managers have little, if any, authority to make loans, but rather must
refer credit requests to the head office, which results in excessive delay
and red tape.!8 The data accumulated by the drafters of the report did
not support this charge that borrowers were subject to greater incon-
venience at out-of-town branches of branch banks than at local
unit banks.'
Service charges for both regular and special individual checking
accounts were found to be higher at the big branch banks than any-
2 Id. at 8.
83Id. at 9.
84 Ibid.
35 Id. at 11-12.
Sod. at 12.
8 7 Id. at 84 n.64.
88 Id. at 13.
s9 Id. at 87.
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where else in the state, but the study also revealed that the arrival of a
branch office led to the payment of higher interest rates on savings
accounts.90
The most significant finding in the report for the user of banking
services was that the large New York City banks offered the most
liberal terms on auto and home purchase loans. The opening of these
banks has had immediate and drastic effects on the loan policies of the
suburban institutions which theretofore had been immune from com-
petitive pressure in this area. On October 3, 1962, Franklin National
lowered its personal loan rates from its previous rate of 6% at discount
to 4.75% at discount. This change was made to match the rates of
First National City, Chemical and Chase Manhattan, which had just
established branches in Nassau County."
The report's findings-"lower rates on most loans, higher rates
on savings accounts, more liberal repayment terms and higher loan
value ratios, greater availability of services and facilities and larger
loan limits for the consumer" 92-constitute a strong endorsement for
the further expansion of the large New York City banks throughout
the metropolitan area. There can be no doubt that branch banks can
and are more likely to satisfy the heterogeneity of consumer demands
than local unit banks immunized from the pressure of competition.
IV. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS
The passage of the Omnibus Banking Law was a step taken by
the New York State Legislature to enable the banking industry to
integrate the New York metropolitan community into a single banking
area. The act has benefited the banking public, but changes in the
New York Banking Law and the National Banking Act are necessary
to promote further the public interest. Although such legislation has
been considered by the New York legislature, 3 this Comment does not
attempt to posit fundamental changes, such as statewide branching
or merging, but rather to concentrate on the weaknesses inherent in
the present statutory scheme and the federal legislation which comple-
ments it, and to posit changes that will facilitate the integration of the
New York metropolitan area into a single banking unit while main-
taining the basic approach taken by the original Omnibus Law.
There are two structural changes which should be made in the
present branching law: elimination of the "home office" protection
provision, and the expansion of the area into which New York City
banks can expand to include Suffolk County and those parts of the
present Third Banking District-Rockland, Ulster, Orange and
0 Id. at 141-42.
91 N.Y. Times, Oct 3, 1961, p. 53, col. 2.
92 N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1964, p. 39, col. 3.
93N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1963, § 3, p. 1, col. 6.
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Sullivan Counties-which constitute an integral part of the New York
metropolitan community.
The "home office" protection provision has the effect of forcing
banks wishing to expand to pay a substantial premium in order to
gain entry into new areas. Aside from the unfairness of this scheme,
it insulates many areas from effective competition and fosters the
continued lethargy of small banks.
After passage of the Omnibus Law, New York City bankers were
unanimous in announcing their intention not to pay the premium that
Philadelphia institutions had paid to gain entry into suburbia. How-
ever, exorbitant premiums have been paid." The only beneficiaries
of the "home office" protection provision are the stockholders of the
small suburban unit banks, and it has been the alliance between
suburban and rural politicians and small bankers which has defeated
all efforts to delete this provision from the Banking Law. 5
The effect on the banking public when "home office" protection is
lost in a certain area is certainly beneficial, for there follows a drastic
increase in the number of banking institutions in the community.
Within a short time after Chemical Bank New York Trust Company
acquired the First National Bank of Mount Vernon, First National
City, Chase Manhattan and National Bank of Westchester had opened
branch offices in Mount Vernon." This fact, however, must deter
banks from merging, for in addition to the premium paid for the
branch, they are soon confronted with numerous competitors in the
community when they alone paid the premium to enter.
The argument for expansion of the area into which New York
City banks can branch is that many smaller communities present the
potential for a very unbalanced banking business. Some wealthy
suburban communities may generate a sizable time deposit and personal
checking account volume but may have virtually no business loan
demand. Middle class residential areas may provide substantial
demand for installment and mortgage loans but inadequate deposit
volume. The branch system provides for mobility of funds and can
shift excess reserves for lending through other outlets of the system.
Thus, an office of some branch banks may even have a loan-to-deposit
ratio of over 100%.
The unit bank must maintain some reasonable relationship be-
tween its total loans and total deposits.1 7 There is room for a wide
range of portfolio composition, but generally a bank cannot operate
safely with a loan-to-deposit ratio of 95% or operate profitably with
N.Y. Times, June 20, 1962, p. 43, col. 1.
95 N.Y. Times, June 1, 1964, p. 1, col. 6.
16 N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1964, p. 51, col. 1.
97 Shull & Horowitz, Branch Banking and the Structure of Competition, 1 NAT'L
BAcNNG REv. 301, 337 (1964).
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a ratio of 5 %.os And most bankers would be unsatisfied with a loan
portfolio consisting entirely of real estate or installment loans. 9 The
unit bank, therefore, must more or less match its supply of funds with
the demand for funds in a single community, whereas the branch bank
system can match supply with demand for the larger and more
heterogeneous area it serves.
Suffolk County is the fastest growing county in New York State-
665,000 in 1960 to 900,000 by December 31, 1965 q--and geograph-
ically is a part of the New York metropolitan area. Its integration
into the banking area of the community has been proposed annually
but to date has been rejected by the state legislature. Inclusion of
this county into the area into which New York City banks can branch
has the support of the present New York State Superintendent of
Banks "' but not that of the state legislature, for the rural block sees
the piecemeal extension of the powers of New York City banks as a
direct threat to their dominant position in the legislative chambers
of the state.
The present day political opposition to expansion of the area into
which New York City banks may branch appears to be insurmountable.
An alternative and politically more palatable manner in which to
achieve such expansion would be to permit New York City banks to
merge with banks in an enlarged area but not to permit them to
establish de novo branches there. This method of expansion would
probably arouse less political opposition, for entry would be on a
more limited scale; and each entry would undoubtedly be accomplished
only if a substantial premium were paid to the shareholders of the
local bank absorbed.
The implementation of this proposal ... would, however, require
congressional modification of section 36(c) of the National Banking
Act, which provides in part:
A national banking association may, with the approval of
the Comptroller of Currency, establish and operate new
branches: (1) within the limits of the city, town or village
in which said association is situated, if such establishment
and operation are at the time expressly authorized to State
banks by the law of the State in question; and (2) at any
point within the State in which said association is situated, if
such establishment and operation are at the time authorized
to State banks by the statute law of the State in question by
language specifically granting such authority affirmatively
98 Ibid.
99 Id. at 337 n.48.
100 N.Y. Times, May 11, 1965, p. 33, col. 2.
101 N.Y. Times, May 3, 1965, p. 51, col. 8.
102 A similar proposal, for statewide merger powers, has been made. • Ibid.
OMNIBUS BANKING LAW
and not merely by implication or recognition, and subject to
the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of the
State on State banks.'03
Clarification is necessary because Comptroller Saxon has said that he
would construe a statute permitting statewide merging by state banks
as authority for national banks to branch statewide."° His theory
is that procedurally there would be a merger-branching distinction, but
in reality it would be a distinction without substance."3 Although
there appears to be a significant substantive difference, °0  Mr. Saxon
does have case support for his position. In Walker Bank & Trust Co.
v. Saxon,"'7 the court upheld the Comptroller's action in permitting
a national bank to establish a branch de novo even though the state
statute permitted branching only by taking over an existing bank.
However, in Commercial Security Bank v. Saxon,' it was held that
if state banks are prohibited from opening branches except by acquiring
an existing bank, a nationally-chartered bank is subject to the same
restriction.
Both these cases were decided in federal district courts, and until
this conflict over the interpretation of "as to location" in section
36(c) (2) is resolved either by the Supreme Court, which could con-
ceivably take many years, or by Congress, the New York legislature
is not going to act. Significant banking legislation, therefore, is not
likely to be forthcoming until Congress amends section 36(c) (2) so
as to insure that nationally-chartered banks are bound to exactly the
same standards as state-chartered banks when attempting to establish
branch offices.
In addition to its failure to subject nationally-chartered banks to
the same branching restrictions as state banks, section 36(c) (2) also
is defective in its failure to give nationally-chartered banks the right to
establish branches in every case where a state bank would be permitted
to do so. As presently enacted, the section lends itself to an inter-
pretation which in some cases gives a competitive advantage to state
banks merely because of the type of charter they possess. The source
of the difficulty is the requirement that in order for a national bank
to take advantage of a state statute authorizing branching, the authori-
zation must be "by language specifically granting such authority
affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition." 109 This
103 REv. STAT. § 5155 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1964). (Emphasis
added.)
104 N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1964, § 3, p. 1, col. 2.
105 Ibid.
106 See page 234 supra.
107234 F. Supp. 74 (N.D. Utah 1964).
108236 F. Supp. 457 (D.D.C. 1964).
109 REv. STAT. § 5155 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §36(c) (1964).
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language should be deleted and replaced with "as it has been judicially
or administratively interpreted." The need for this change is drama-
tized by the case of Union Savings Bank v. Saxon."' Tinker National
Bank, on March 15, 1962, applied to the Comptroller of the Currency
for permission to open a branch office in an unincorporated area
immediately contiguous to the incorporated village of Patchogue.
Permission was granted and the branch office was opened at a location
close to the originally proposed site.
The Union Savings Bank of Patchogue contended that the
Comptroller had violated section 36(c) (2)."'l The disagreement be-
tween the parties centered upon the meaning of the words "unincor-
porated village" in section 105 of the New York Banking Code. The
statutory language is critical, for nowhere in section 105 or in the entire
Banking Code is the phrase "unincorporated village" defined. The
Comptroller interpreted the words to mean any unincorporated area that
might theoretically qualify for incorporation as a village under section 2
of the New York Village Law." This interpretation was in accordance
with the interpretation given the phrase by the New York banking
authorities." 3
The appellant, Union Savings Bank of Patchogue, contended that
the word "village" connoted an area possessed of some attributes of
community life or interest-the site of the Tinker branch was not in
a shopping or business district in any way distinct from the downtown
business district of the incorporated Village of Patchogue."' The court
held that section 36(c) (2) was clear, and despite the fact that the
Comptroller's interpretation was in accord with section 105 as inter-
preted by the New York banking authorities, "a national bank may
branch only where a state bank branch would be authorized 'by the
statute law of the state in question by language specifically granting
such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recog-
nition.' " 115 Interpretation of a provision by the New York Banking
Department, said the court, "would not be authority for the establish-
ment of the Tinker branch." "16
And finally, steps should be taken to narrow the broad discretion
which has been granted to the state banking agencies in regulating
bank mergers and branching. Presently, the determination of whether
the public convenience and advantage will be promoted by the establish-
110 335 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
Ill Union Say. Bank v. Saxon, 335 F.2d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
112 Id. at 721.
"13 State Bank v. Bell, 197 Misc. 97, 96 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup. Ct 1949), aff'd, 277
App. Div. 924, 98 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1950) (per curiam).
114 The bank site was 400 feet east of the incorporated village, and the sole reason
for the selection of this location was that the "home office" rule precluded Tinker from
going into the village.
"15 335 F.2d at 723.
116 Ibid.
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ment of an additional branch office has been left to the sole discretion
of the Superintendent and the Banking Board. The courts may not
control this discretion nor does the judiciary have the power to
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative officials. Only
where it is manifest that the Superintendent and Banking Board have
exceeded their statutory authority or where their actions have been
"erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory or palpably illegal"
will the court invalidate the administrative decision." 7  The present
Banking Law provides only for an investigation by the Superintendent
of Banks when an application for a branch is made. 18 A hearing is not
required, and there is no statutory requirement that the Banking Board
promulgate rules and regulations setting forth the standards to be
applied in ruling on applications for permission to open branch
banking offices.
The state legislature ought to enact legislation providing that
upon the request of interested parties, including banking institutions
that will be adversely affected if the application is approved, public
hearings shall be held. The Banking Board should be required to
promulgate rules and regulations setting forth the criteria upon which
its decisions will be based and also to state publicly the reasons why
a particular application has been approved or disapproved. A formal-
ized procedure would constitute a safeguard against venality, facilitate
judicial review if venality were suspected and assure the public that
the need for additional banking facilities was being determined upon
a rational basis.
117 State Bank v. Bell, 197 Misc. 97, 104, 96 N.Y.S.2d 851, 857 (Sup. Ct. 1949),
aff'd, 277 App. Div. 924, 98 N.Y.S.2d 493 (1950) (per curiam).
"18 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 29.
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